1 Estimates of the pre-contact Native American population in North America and in what would become the continental United States vary dramatically and remain contested. The following are some influential estimates. In 1841, the artist George Catlin estimated 16,000,000; and in 1860 the missionary Emmanuel Domenech estimated 16,000,000 to 17,000,000 in North America, not including Mexico, "two centuries ago. " In 1928 and 1939, anthropologists States and Alaska, 1910 (Washington, D.C., 1915) , 10. According to Thornton, "the single most important factor in American Indian population decline was an increased death rate due to diseases introduced from the Eastern Hemisphere"; American Indian Holocaust and Survival, 44 . Epidemiologist and microbiologist Francis L. Black wrote, "Approximately 56 million people died as a result of European exploration in the New World [and] most died of introduced diseases." Black, "Why Did They Die?" Science 258 (December 11, 1992 (December 11, ): 1739 (December 11, -1740 Academics continue to debate whether or not Native Americans-or any groups of them-suffered genocide during the conquest and colonization of the Americas. It is a question that should matter not just to scholars and Native Americans, but to all U.S. citizens. Although the political and administrative boundaries of the United States have been imposed upon indigenous peoples, they form a cohesive unit of historical analysis with real meaning and repercussions for scholars, American Indians, and non-Indians in both the past and present. While the stakes of the debate as it relates to Native Americans may echo those in other genocide debates, new methods of inquiry will help to move this particular debate forward. Examining statements of genocidal intent, massacres, state-sponsored body-part bounties, and mass death in government custody can provide scholars with a rubric for locating, evaluating, or ruling out possible instances of genocide. Detailed case studies are crucial to this approach. They can reframe the debate by focusing on the question of genocide for particular tribes rather than all Native Americans. Applying these methods to two specific cases-Connecticut's Pequot Indians and California's Yuki Indianssuggests how this approach might then be used to locate and define other cases of genocide within and beyond the Americas. 2 THE NEAR-ANNIHILATION OF North America's indigenous peoples remains a formative event in U.S. history. Along with wars, real estate transactions of often questionable validity, the making and breaking of treaties, forced removal, confinement to reservations, and the 1887 Dawes Allotment Act, which reduced federally recognized Native American landholdings by about 90,000,000 acres, the American Indian population cataclysm played a central role in the clearing of hundreds of millions of acres for colonization. These lands, in turn, provided the vast geography and the cornucopia of natural resources upon which the modern United States was built. Thus, how we explain the Native American population catastrophe informs how we understand the making of the U.S. and its colonial origins.
In 1622, the Mayflower passenger Robert Cushman wrote of America: "Our land is full . . . their land is empty. This then is a sufficient reason to prove our going thither to live lawful: their land is spacious and void, and they are few and do but run over the grass, as do also the foxes and wild beasts. They are not industrious, neither have [they] art, science, skill or faculty to use either the land or the commodities of it; but all spoils, rots, and is marred for want of manuring, gathering, ordering, etc." Articulating the vacuum domicilium, or "empty domicile," theory, which many would cite in attempting to justify their conquest and colonization of North America, Cushman claimed that American Indians did not inhabit their homelands fully enough, either in population density or in economic development, to justify their having legal ownership, particularly in so-called "empty" areas. Cushman 1739. For additional scholarship on the causes, dynamics, and impact of introduced diseases on Native Americans see footnote 7. 2 Thornton noted this debate in "Native American Demographic and Tribal Survival into the Twenty-First Century," American Studies 46, no. 3-4 (2005) : 23-38, here 31.
was not alone in such thinking. 3 In 1516, the English lawyer Thomas More anticipated that colonists would, and preachers John Donne and John Cotton and even Pennsylvania proprietor William Penn later asserted that legally they could, seize "voyde and vacannt," "abandoned" or unfilled, "vacant," and "Waste, or unculted Country." 4 The English philosopher and Carolina Colony secretary John Locke then contended in 1690 that colonists could obtain legal title to such Indian land with his "agricultural argument," which suggested that agriculturally unimproved lands could be taken by those who improved them. 5 Meanwhile, "Old World" diseases such as diphtheria, influenza, malaria, measles, scarlet fever, smallpox, typhus, and whooping cough killed great numbers, diminishing many Native American populations while buttressing the specious vacuum domicilium theory in some Europeans' minds. Thus emerged the almost canonical trope of American Indian population decline as a natural disaster created by biological forces, and the expropriation of increasingly "empty" Native American lands as a just response to opportunities created by regrettable, but inevitable, natural devastation. 6 Disease did kill untold numbers of Native Americans, and scholars continue to explore the causes, dynamics, variability, and magnitude of disease-induced population losses. Yet the emphasis on disease as the prime agent of American Indian demographic decline tends to overshadow the equally undeniable role of violence in the population catastrophe and in the conquest of the United States. The determination of whether or not such violence constituted genocide requires a more careful examination of the role of human agency in this cataclysm and whether or not some colonizers committed what legal scholar William Schabas has called "the crime of crimes." 7 It requires an exploration of the possibility of genocide in the foundations of U.S. history, or at least that of some regions. These are difficult issues. Nonetheless, the question of whether genocide occurred in the United States and its colonial antecedents should be on conference agendas, discussed in classrooms, debated in public forums, and pursued in scholarly journals because the stakes are so high for scholars, American Indians, and all U.S. citizens.
If the conquest and colonization of some regions of the United States, if not the entire nation, involved deliberate attempts to annihilate Native American peoples, scholars will need to reevaluate current interpretive axioms and address new quandaries. Scholars could, for example, reexamine the assumption that indirect effects of colonization, such as the spread of disease, rather than deliberate actions, such as murder, were the leading cause of death in most or all encounters between newcomers and Native Americans. Exceptionalist interpretations of U.S. history-which suggest that the United States is fundamentally unlike other nations-may also lose validity as researchers compare genocides in the U.S. to other mass killings and place them within global comparative frameworks. Where scholars document a genocide, it will be necessary to evaluate what roles colonial, federal, state, and territorial governments played, as well as whether the event was part of a recurring regional or national pattern. Larger questions then follow. What tended to catalyze genocide? Who ordered and carried out the killing? Why do we not know more about these events? Did democracy drive mass murder? And, ultimately, was genocide central to the making of the contemporary United States? 8 Given its political, economic, psychological, and health ramifications, the genocide question is particularly urgent for the approximately 5,220,000 U.S. citizens of self-reported Native American ancestry. Should tribes press for official apologies, reparations, and control of land where genocidal events took place? Should tribes marshal evidence of genocide in cases involving tribal sovereignty and federal recognition? How should Native American communities commemorate mass murder while also emphasizing successful accommodation, resistance, survival, and cultural renewal? The psychological issues related to genocide are also fraught. What happens when a tribal member learns that she or he is a descendant of both perpetrators tility: A New Look at the Demographic Collapse of Native Populations in the Wake of Western Contact," Journal of American Studies 24, no. 3 (1990) Southeast, 1492 -1715 (Lincoln, Neb., 2007 . For one study of how disease has been used to limit the discussion of violence, see Kelton, Cherokee Medicine, Colonial Germs: An Indigenous Nation's Fight against Smallpox, 1518 -1824 (Norman, Okla., forthcoming 2015 and victims? How might Native American people reconcile increased knowledge of genocide-sometimes at the hands of the United States-with their frequently intense patriotism? Finally, what role might acknowledgment of genocide have on the "intergenerational/historical trauma" in some Native American communities and that trauma's connection to present-day illnesses, substance abuse, domestic violence, and suicide? 9 The question of genocide in the history of the United States and its colonial antecedents also poses explosive political, economic, educational, and psychological questions for all U.S. citizens. Acknowledgment and reparations are central issues. Should elected government officials tender public apologies to Native Americans, as Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush did in the 1980s for the relocation and internment of some 120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II? Reparations are an important subordinate issue. Should federal officials offer compensation to American Indians, along the lines of the more than $1.6 billion that Congress awarded to 82,210 of those Japanese Americans and their heirs? The question of commemoration is closely linked. Will non-Indian citizens support or tolerate the commemoration of mass murders committed by some of the nation's forefathers with the same kinds of monuments, museums, and state-legislated days of remembrance that today commemorate the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust? Will genocides against Native Americans join those systematic mass murders in school curricula and public discourse? 10 Steps have been taken toward federal acknowledgment of some wrongs done to Native Americans. In 1989 and 1990, Congress passed the National Museum of the American Indian Act and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, which in combination mandate that federally funded institutions protect Native American gravesites and return human remains and objects taken from Native Americans under certain circumstances. In 2000, the head of the federal government's Bureau of Indian Affairs, Kevin Gover, publicly apologized for that organization's role in the lethal "removal of the southeastern tribal nations" and "the ethnic cleansing that befell the western tribes." Gover, who is Comanche and Pawnee, also acknowledged "the cowardly killing of women and children" and "tragedy on a scale so ghastly that it cannot be dismissed as merely the inevitable consequence of the clash of competing ways of life." 11 Four years later, six U.S. senators and a congresswoman introduced "A joint resolution to acknowledge a long history of of-9 The 2010 census reported 5,220,579 people as being Native American or part Native American. See Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones, and Roberto R. Ramirez, "Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010," March 2011, www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf; Eduardo Duran, Judith Firehammer, and John Gonzalez, "Liberation Psychology as the Path toward Healing Cultural Soul Wounds," Journal of Counseling & Development 86, no. 3 (2008) : 288-295, here 292. For more on intergenerational trauma, see Yael Danieli, ed., International Handbook of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma (New York, 1998) . In 2007, several hundred Indian and non-Indian participants at the 37th Annual United Indian Health Services Annual Board and Staff Meeting for northwestern California discussed the connection between the historical trauma resulting from genocide and contemporary Native American health issues.
10 Eric K. Yamamoto and Liann Ebesugawa, "Report on Redress: The Japanese American Internment," in Pablo de Greiff, ed., The Handbook of Reparations (New York, 2006), 257-283, here 257-258, 269-270, 274. 11 Kevin Gover, "Remarks of Kevin Gover, Assistant Scholars soon began using this new tool. Lemkin planned chapters on "Genocide against the American Indians" and "The Indians in North America (in part)" for two genocide histories that he was working on, but he died in 1959 before he could complete either project. 15 In the 1960s and 1970s, informed by the rising awareness of the Holocaust and genocide, a few activists and scholars began using the term to describe historical violence against American Indians. President Reagan focused additional attention on genocide by endorsing the Genocide Convention in 1984. Three years later, anthropologist Russell Thornton published the first scholarly monograph addressing genocide in the continental United States as a whole. Thornton argued that genocide was one of several causes of Native American demographic decline, but that only in certain cases did it result in total extermination. 16 The following year, the United States ratified the Convention, with caveats. Meanwhile, the field of genocide studies was beginning to coalesce, and some of its foundational publications touched on questions of genocide in colonial New England and the nineteenth-century U.S. 17 crime without law) bars the prosecution of genocide perpetrators for crimes committed before their nation became a party to the UN Genocide Convention. 15 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1975 19 Thornton then critiqued Stannard's work for focusing on genocide to the exclusion of the axiom that "Populations constantly change in size due to births and deaths (and migrations)." 20 Other scholars also began mentioning genocide against Native Americans while emphasizing different theses. For example, ethnic studies scholar Ward Churchill suggested that genocide began with the European invasion and continued into the post-Cold War era through "genocidal . . . Internal Colonialism." 21 Twenty-first-century scholars have offered additional assertions that Native Americans suffered genocide. 22 Still, while histories of violence against American Indians abound, detailed case studies marshaling substantial evidence of both genocidal intent and specific genocidal acts to support the broad thesis of genocide in America remain few and far between. 23 Examples include Thornton's three brief case studies, Stannard's four short studies, and the eighty-eight pages of Blood and Soil that historian Ben Kiernan dedicated to instances of genocide in "Colonial North America, 1600-1776" and "Genocide in the United States." 24 In opposition, other scholars have claimed that Native Americans rarely, or never, suffered genocide. In 1992, historian James Axtell called "'genocide' . . . inaccurate as a description of the vast majority of encounters between Europeans and Indians." 25 In 1994, religious studies scholar Steven Katz deemed "the depopulation of the New World . . . largely an unintended tragedy." 26 Five years later, historian Robert Utley asserted that using the term "genocide" in relation to American Indians "grossly falsifies history," since "No more than a tiny portion of the white population of the United States, mainly in the West, ever advocated" the "intentional obliteration" of American Indians "by means of mass physical annihilation." 27 In 2004, historian William Rubinstein insisted that "American policy towards the Indians . . . never actually encompassed genocide," and historian Guenter Lewy agreed: "Genocide was never American policy, nor was it the result of policy." 28 In 2014, historian Gary Anderson added that "Genocide did not occur in America," but "ethnic cleansing" did. 29 Two factors have polarized the American genocide debate. First, not all participants agree on what genocide means. Second, most participants frame the debate in collective terms, rather than exploring the question on a tribe-by-tribe basis. This framing has emphasized that a verdict of genocide or not genocide be rendered for the continental United States as a whole (and sometimes all of the Americas) from first contact to the present. For the debate to move forward, both issues must be addressed.
The American genocide debate is in part the struggle to define a word. Most participants who stated a particular definition began with the Genocide Convention, but Stannard, Lewy, Thornton, Alfred Cave, and Kiernan are among the few who accepted it unmodified. Others disagreed over both who is protected and what crimes are genocidal. Churchill expanded the Convention's list of protected groups to include any "human group," while also extending the list of genocidal acts to include physical, biological, and cultural genocide. 30 In contrast, Rubinstein narrowed the scope of genocidal acts-"Genocide might . . . be defined as the deliberate killing of most or all members of a collective group"-while excluding "most 'acts' which are construed as genocide in international law," beyond direct killing. 31 Axtell expanded the scope of protected groups to include any "group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator," but limited genocide to "one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group." 32 Katz also expanded the range of protected groups, but insisted: "genocide applies only when there is an actualized intent . . . to physically destroy an entire group." 33 Finally, Anderson defined genocide as "a concerted effort to kill large numbers of people or indeed to annihilate a given people" that "a legitimate government must plan, organize, and implement." 34 Genocide is, however, more than an academic concept. It is a crime defined by an international legal treaty and subsequent case law. On December 9, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Genocide Convention and its definition "unanimously and without abstentions." 35 It remains the only authoritative international legal definition. Moreover, unlike at least twenty-two alternative definitions proffered since 1959, it has teeth. To date, 146 nations have signed or are parties to the Genocide Convention. In addition, it is supported and further defined-as a legal instrument-by a growing body of international case law. The Con- 28 vention thus provides a powerful, though imperfect, definition for investigating possible cases of genocide. 36 The second factor polarizing the American genocide debate arises from a focus on judging the entire history of the continental United States, and sometimes the whole Western Hemisphere, from 1492 to the present, as fundamentally genocidal or not genocidal. This is a case of lumping when splitting is in order. Contact between Native Americans and Europeans in the continental United States has spanned centuries, ranged over 2,959,000 square miles, and involved interactions among British, Dutch, French, Mexican, Russian, Spanish, Swedish, Texan, Confederate, and U.S. regimes-all of which changed over time-and hundreds of American Indian peoples, themselves hardly homogeneous or static. Despite some exceptions, scholars on both sides of the debate have largely avoided in-depth analyses of particular regions in specific periods or during particular tribes' demographic declines. 37 This dearth of specific case studies, along with definitional differences, helps explain the dispute's abstract and unresolved nature.
It is difficult to argue meaningfully about genocide on a national level without either definitional agreement or robust local studies to support broad conclusions. Thornton blazed a trail by bringing brief tribal case studies into his argument. Stannard touched upon the role of both genocidal intent and genocidal actions, as did Churchill. More recently, Thornton noted, "Physical genocide seems more characteristic of years and decades than of centuries," while Kiernan demonstrated the importance of regional studies, emphasizing genocidal intent, command structures, and genocidal massacres. 38 Still, as historian Dan Stone observed in 2008, "it is remarkable that, given the enormous historiography on the colonial period and frontier conflict [in North America], there is not more that directly addresses the question of genocide." 39 DESPITE THE PIONEERING WORK DONE by Thornton, Stannard, Kiernan, and others, there remains a need for additional detailed case studies to provide the data that will permit a more accurate and comprehensive assessment of genocide's occurrence and 37 Some exceptions include Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival, [109] [110] [111] [112] [113] [200] [201] [202] [203] [204] [205] [206] [207] [208] Stannard, American Holocaust, [111] [112] [113] [114] [115] [116] [117] [121] [122] [123] [124] [134] [135] [136] [137] [138] [139] [140] [141] [142] [143] [144] [145] [146] and Kiernan, Blood and Soil, chaps. 6 and 8 . 38 Thornton, "Native American Demographic and Tribal Survival into the Twenty-First Century," 32. 39 Dan Stone, "Introduction," in Stone, Historiography of Genocide, 1-6, here 3.
frequency in the history of the United States and its colonial antecedents. How might such studies be done? In-depth tribal and geographical case studies covering discrete time periods first require that markers be located indicating the possible occurrence of genocide. Annihilationist statements, massacres, state-sponsored body-part bounties, and mass death in government custody are four ways of locating, and ultimately defining, prima facie cases of genocide. Some non-Indian policymakers articulated their intent to annihilate Native American peoples both before and after 1776. As early as 1622, Virginia Colony leaders responded to an Indian attack by planning "a sharp revenge . . . even to . . . the rooting them out for being longer a people vppon the face of the Earth." 40 45 The idea of exterminating American Indians became increasingly common during the nineteenth century. Jefferson was perhaps the first sitting U.S. president to consider genocide when he wrote in 1807, "if ever we are constrained to lift the hatchet against any tribe, we will never lay it down till that tribe is exterminated, or is driven beyond the Mississippi," adding: "In war, they will kill some of us; we shall destroy all of them." 46 Congress, Inclusive, Commencing March 3, 1789 , and Ending March 3, 1815 , 38 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1832 . 46 Jefferson quoted in Kiernan, Blood and Soil, 328. "to the tomb" with this cheerful thought: "true philanthropy reconciles the mind to these vicissitudes as it does to the extinction of one generation to make room for another. thirty-one states, from 1539 to 1890. (See the Appendix for a list of the sources on which the map is based.) It is in no way comprehensive. Detailed investigations of specific regions' and Native American nations' histories will likely reveal a greater density of massacres across both time and space than is represented on this map. Taken alone, "massacre on the scale of Sand Creek, Wounded Knee and Mystic" may be "demographically insignificant" to the overall American Indian population cataclysm, as White has suggested. 56 However, it is not obligatory to limit our search for the latter's causes to only one major factor. As scholars study massacre clusters and move toward calculating the total number of Native Americans massacred in American history, the cumulative demographic impact of these mass killings will be revealed as significant, even if they do not approach the number of deaths caused by disease.
State-sponsored body-part bounties-rewards officially paid for Native Americans' heads and scalps-are another manifestation of exterminationist intent and genocidal crimes that appear frequently in the history of the United States and its colonial antecedents. The act of mutilating enemies is not unusual in world history, and Native Americans sometimes scalped non-Indians, but an examination of bounty programs can serve five functions in reexamining the American genocide debate. First, they indicate sustained, institutionalized killing and its intentional support by authorities who provided both funding and legal impunity to bounty hunters. Second, these programs point to killing policies that deliberately abandoned traditional European rules of war, or jus in bello, when administrators offered bounties for the heads or scalps of civilians, women, and children, and because it was often difficult to distinguish between heads and scalps belonging to so-called enemy versus friendly Indians, or between "hostiles" and children or other blameless members of a targeted "enemy" group. Third, because bounty programs often involved considerable monetary sums, studying them can help scholars map genocidal command structures. Fourth, because administrators sometimes kept records of bounties paid or body parts collected, these bounty programs generated quantitative evidence of genocidal state-sponsored crimes. Finally, such programs had demographic impacts beyond the direct killing of individuals. By forcing Indians to evade bounty hunters, body-part bounties interfered with subsistence, housing, medical care, and reproduction, thus providing additional, less direct, evidence of genocide. 57 In sum, bounty programs may flag regions or times when governments or their agents institutionalized genocide against Native Americans.
Policymakers offered bounties for Native American heads or scalps in at least twenty-three states or their colonial, territorial, or Mexican antecedents. (Saint Paul, Minn., 1864), 192-193, here 192; "GENERAL ORDERS NO. 44 [July 20, 1863]," ibid., 195-196, here 196; and "GEN-ERAL ORDERS NO. 60 [September 22, 1863] members of the group," "Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group," "Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part," "Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group," and "Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." Nineteenth-century removal and incarceration on federal reservations proved lethal to large numbers of Native Americans. More than 4,000 Choctaws died of hunger, exposure, accidents, and disease during and immediately after their deportation, under military guard, to Oklahoma in 1832 and 1833. Some 700 Creeks died while being marched from Alabama to Oklahoma in 1836. At least 3,500 others died of disease during the first year after they arrived. And perhaps 8,000
Cherokees "died as a more or less direct result of the Trail of Tears" before, during, and after 1838. 69 Despite substantial evidence pointing to the lethality of forced removal and confinement on reservations, such policies proliferated. Of some 1,300 Dakota people taken to Crow Creek in 1863, fewer than 1,000 survived to see their first winter there. In the Southwest, the "Long Walk" to New Mexico's Bosque Redondo Reservation and subsequent malnutrition and illness killed perhaps 2,000, if not more, Navajos between 1863 and 1868. 70 To the northwest, federal officials deported 153 Modocs from Oregon to Oklahoma in 1873. By 1881, more than a third had died from poor conditions and disease exacerbated by corruption. Inadequately fed, 94 Northern Cheyenne also incarcerated in Oklahoma died between 1876 and 1878, while in 1884, some 400 out of not more than 2,600 Piegans starved to death at Montana's Blackfoot Indian Agency. Between 1877 and 1881, some 180 out of 431 Nez Percés also died in federal captivity. Then, in 1886, the U.S. Army made 498 Chiricahua Apachesincluding 399 women and children-prisoners of war. By 1894, 246 were dead. Births barely outnumbered additional deaths, and by 1913, only 261 Chiricahua Apache prisoners remained, after twenty-seven years of incarceration. Again and again, mass Native American death followed the imposition of federal custody. 71 GENOCIDAL STATEMENTS, MASSACRES, official body-part bounties, and mass death in government custody are four ways of locating and defining prima facie cases of genocide. So how does this method operate in practice? Two American Indian genocides-one in seventeenth-century Connecticut, the other in nineteenth-century California-are illustrative of how these markers can be used to locate and define genocides in North America and beyond.
The Pequot Indians of Connecticut endured one of the earliest genocides in what would become the United States, an event now remembered as the Pequot War. Colonists' motives for attacking were complex, but their immediate casus belli was the July 20, 1636, killing of the English trader John Oldham by Narragansett Indians in waters near Block Island, off Rhode Island. Block Island's Narragansetts were not allied with the Pequots. Yet Massachusetts Bay Colony leaders responded by attacking both Block Island Narragansetts and Connecticut Pequots, who had previously "slain one Captaine Norton, and Captaine Stone, with seven more of their company." 72 This expedition aimed to kill substantial numbers of American Indians.
On August 25, 1636, John Endicott's ninety-eight-man force sailed from Boston. "They had commission," wrote Massachusetts Colony governor John Winthrop, "to put to death the men of Block Island, but to spare the women and children, and to bring them away [enslave them] and from thence to go to the Pequods to demand the murderers of Capt. Stone and other English [by Pequots], and one thousand fathom of wampum for damages, etc., and some of their children as hostages, which if they should refuse, they were to obtain it by force." 73 At Block Island, Endicott's men failed to carry out these orders. According to one of his officers, Captain John Underhill, "the Indians being retired into Swamps, so as wee could not find them, Ended June 30, 1913 , H. Doc. 1009 , vol. 2, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914 . The off-reservation U.S. Indian boarding school system, initiated in 1879, constituted another form of federal removal and incarceration that may have been genocidal. Some guardians sent young people voluntarily. However, federal agents used coercion and force, sometimes supported by legislation, to take many others, some as young as five years old, to schools that were often far from students' families and communities. Frequently barred from returning home for years, many students tried to escape, but many died. The total number of students who died as a result of attending these schools remains unknown. Overviews of the boarding schools include Michael C. Coleman, American Indian Children at School, 1850 -1930 (Jackson, Miss., 1993 ; David Wallace Adams, Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience, 1875 -1928 (Lawrence, Kans., 1995 ; Margaret L. Archuleta, Brenda J. Child, and K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Away from Home: American Indian Boarding School Experiences, 1879 (Phoenix, Ariz., 2000 ; Brenda J. Child, Boarding School Seasons: American Indian Families, 1900 (Lincoln, Neb., 1998 wee burnt and spoyled both houses and corne in great abundance." 74 Still, the expedition failed to kill many Narragansetts, take slaves, or acquire substantial loot.
Following orders, Endicott now sailed against the Pequots. Underhill recalled: "the Indians spying of us came running in multitudes along the water side, crying, what cheere Englishmen, what cheere, what doe you come for? They not thinking we intended warre went on cheerefully untill they come to Pequeat riuer." Then they "cryed, what Englishman, what cheere, what cheere, are you hoggerie, will you cram us? That is, are you angry, will you kill us, and doe you come to fight." Endicott demanded the killers' heads, and negotiations ensued. A Pequot "Ambassadour" explained that the Pequots had thought that Stone and company were Dutch, not English. The English rejected this explanation and issued an ultimatum: deliver the killers' heads or "wee will fight with you." The Pequots continued to negotiate, and the English attacked. 75 Governor Winthrop later wrote, "The Naragansett men told us after, that thirteen of the Pequods were killed, and forty wounded," and that Endicott's men burned sixty wigwams. 76 Thus began the Pequot War.
Pequots now besieged Connecticut's Fort Saybrook and "slew diverse Men." 77 During the siege, Pequots-perhaps hoping to end the conflict-asked the fort's commander, Lion Gardiner, "have you fought ynough [?] ." Some years later, Gardiner recollected that the Pequots then "asked if we did vse to kill women & childre [n?]" His answer was ominous: "we said they should see yt heraftr," to which some Pequots allegedly responded, "we will goe to conectecott and kill men women & children." 78 Further Anglo-Pequot clashes followed, and by the end of April 1637, Pequots had killed "about Thirty" colonists in all, while suffering an unknown number of casualties. 79 On May 1, Connecticut's General Court joined the conflict by declaring "offensiue warr" against the Pequots and mustering ninety men under Captain John Mason to attack. 80 Before they departed, a Hartford minister primed Mason's men for largescale killing. At a Hartford church service, the minister exhorted them to "make their multitudes fall under your warlike weapons." 81 "[A]bout five hundred Indians," including Mohegans under their leader Uncas and Narragansetts under Miantonomi, joined Mason. 82 At Fort Saybrook, Gardiner paid "15 yards of trading Cloath" to Mohegans for at least four Pequot heads. 83 This was perhaps the first head bounty in colonial U.S. history. The combined force, minus some Narragansetts who went home, now sailed toward the Pequots at Mystic, Connecticut, while Underhill moved to meet them. 84 Mason's plan was simple: "We had formerly concluded to destroy them by the Sword and save the Plunder." 85 He intended a final solution to the Pequot problem.
Mason and Underhill attacked at dawn on May 26, 1637, and Mason soon announced, "WE MUST BURN THEM." 86 As Mason torched the "West-side" of Mystic, Underhill "set fire on the South end with a traine of Powder, the fires of both meeting in the center of the Fort." 87 Mason wrote that Mystic's inhabitants "ran as Men most dreadfully Amazed." Then, "when the Fort was thoroughly Fired, Command was given, that all should fall off and surround the Fort." 88 Pequots fired back but "were scorched and burnt . . . deprived of their armes [because] the fire burnt their very bowstrings." Thus, "many were burnt in the Fort, both men, women, and children, others forced out, and came in troopes to the Indians, twentie, and thirtie at a time, which our soldiers received and entertained with the point of the sword; downe fell men, women, and children." 89 The English could have taken scores of Pequots prisoner. Instead, they murdered them in keeping with Mason's plan to "destroy them by the Sword."
How many Pequots were in Mystic that morning remains unclear, but few survived. According to Underhill, Indian eyewitnesses reported "about foure hundred soules in this Fort, and not above five of them escaped out of our hands." 90 Other contemporary writers estimated 300 to 400 killed. 91 Mason wrote that the Mystic Pequots were "utterly Destroyed, to the Number of six or seven Hundred, as some of themselves confessed," while "There were only seven taken Captive & about seven escaped." 92 Supporting his assertion, Mason published a drawing of the fort (see Figure 3 ) containing ninety-eight lodges, and historian Alfred Cave, who authored the definitive Pequot War history, considered Mason's estimate of 600-700 dead "probably more accurate" than Underhill's estimate of about 400. 93 In contrast, colonists lost just "two Slain outright, and about twenty Wounded." 94 The Mystic Massacre shocked many eyewitnesses, but some contemporary writers sought to justify it. According to Underhill, "Great and dolefull was the bloudy sight to the view of young soldiers that never had beene in Warre, to see so many soules lie gasping on the ground so thicke in some places, that you could hardly passe along." Mason and Underhill's Indian allies "cried mach it, mach it ; that is, it is naught, it is naught, because it is too furious, and slaies too many men." Underhill, too, was troubled, but wrote: "sometimes the Scripture declareth women and children must perish with their parents." 95 was the LORD'S Doings, and it is marvelous in our Eyes!" 96 Some political leaders and colonists also endorsed the atrocity. Twenty days after the massacre, Governor Winthrop wrote: "There was a day of thanksgiving kept in all the churches for the victory obtained against the Pequods." 97 Plymouth Colony governor William Bradford later wrote that while "It was a fearfull sight to see them thus frying in ye fyer, and ye streams of blood quenching ye same, and horrible was ye stinck & sente ther of; but ye victory seemed a sweete sacrifice, and they gave the prays therof to God, who had wrought so wonderfuly for them." 98 Underhill, Mason, Winthrop, and Bradford all endorsed the atrocity after the fact. Had Mystic been an isolated event, it would have constituted a single "genocidal massacre." However, it was only the beginning of a systematic state-sponsored killing campaign. Immediately following the massacre, some 300 Pequot warriors from nearby, enraged by the slaughter of their families and fellow Pequots, counterattacked. 99 According to Underhill, in "an houre [we] slew and wounded above a hundred Pequeats, all fighting men that charged us." 100 As they marched to their boats, colonists and their Indian allies repeatedly shot Pequots and "fetch[ed] their Heads," presumably to claim head bounties. 101 Seven Mohegans who had been with the Pequots told the English: "about an hundred Pequets were slaine or hurt, in the fight with the English at their returne from the Fort." 102 The Pequot leader Sassacus, "with the remainder of this massacre [then] fled the Countrey," and Massachusetts mobilized 120 militiamen under Captain Israel Stoughton to hunt down survivors. 103 A two-prong operation now began to "utterly roote them out," according to one contemporary writer. 104 A joint expedition of colonists composed the first prong. Stoughton's force reached the mouth of Connecticut's Thames River in late June, took Pequot prisoners, and on July 5 executed at least twenty-two of them. 105 Forty Connecticut men under Mason then joined him. 106 On July 13 they killed six at New Haven before beheading two Indian leaders at Sachem's Head. 107 Farther down the coast, they surrounded Pequots and local Sasqua Indians in a swamp near Fairfield. After "the English slew but few," at least 180 "old Men, Women and Children" sur-rendered, while others remained in the swamp. 108 Colonists then "killed fortie or fiftie besides those that they cut off in their retrait," while "sixty or seventy" Pequots escaped. 109 In total, the killings of mid-May to mid-July 1637 took a cataclysmic toll on the Pequots. According to Underhill, Pequots were "slaine by the sword, to the number of fifteene hundred soules in the space of two moneths and lesse." 110 Still, the killing continued. According to P. Vincent, writing in 1637, "Some other small parties of them were since destroyed." 111 Montauk and Mohawk Indians constituted the second prong, killing at colonists' behest.
Head bounties encouraged the killing of Pequot survivors, sometimes by enlisting Indian participation with genocidal threats. The Pequot War was one of many instances in which a colonizing regime threatened Indians from one tribe into killing Indians from another. Three days after the Mystic Massacre, Gardiner met with Long Island's Montauk leader Wyandanch and warned him that if "you haue pequits with you . . . they might kill my men, . . . and So we may kill all you for ye pequits but if you will kill all the pequits yt come to you and send me thr heads," then "you shall haue trade with vs." Wyandanch later sent Gardiner a dozen Pequot heads, and Gardiner "paid . . . as I had promised." Wyandanch then "kild . . . many of ye pequits and sent thr heds to" Gardiner, probably fearing that unless he continued this grisly trade, Englishmen would "come and kill vs all as they did ye pequits." 112 Similar fears and rewards likely motivated other New England and New York Indians. In 1637, Mason reported, "The Pequots now became a Prey to all Indians. Happy were they that could bring in their Heads to the English: Of which there came almost daily to Winsor, or Hartford [Connecticut] ." 113 That summer, Mohawks sent the heads and hands of perhaps forty or more Pequots, including Sassacus, to Hartford, for, as Gardiner explained, "they all fered vs." 114 On August 5, Winthrop reported that Englishmen had brought to Boston "part of the skin and lock of hair of Sasacus" and of twenty-six others. On August 26, Winthrop recorded how "The Indians about sent in still many Pequods' heads and hands from Long Island and other places," while on August 31, "The Naragansetts sent us the hands of three Pequods." 115 By demonstrating that body-part bounties-which motivated some or all of this head, hand, and scalp collecting-could be an effective Indian-killing policy, colonists established a lethal, enduring tradition.
During the Pequot War, colonists and their allies killed an estimated "one quarter to two thirds" of all Pequots, while enslaving and intentionally scattering survivors. 116 Some colonial leaders sought total erasure. The September 1638 Treaty of Hartford banished Pequots from their homeland, gave 200 surviving Pequot men and their relatives to the Mohegans and Narragansetts, specified that Pequots "shall no more be called Pequots but Narragansetts and Mohegans," and called for the beheading of any surviving Pequots who had killed or attempted to kill any English person. 117 Dispersal then continued.
Connecticut and Massachusetts colonists used slavery in an attempt to destroy the surviving Pequot community. Colonial authorities ultimately made perhaps 600 Pequots the chattels of their Indian enemies. At least 319 others became Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Plymouth colonists' property or were shipped overseas: at least one to Britain, seventeen to Caribbean bondage on Providence Isle, and eighty or more to slavery in Bermuda. Colonists thus sought to scatter and destroy the Pequot nation. 118 Defying genocidal intentions and policies, Pequots resisted and survived. In 2010, exactly 3,373 U.S. citizens identified themselves as Pequots. Today, many are members of Connecticut's Eastern Pequot Tribal Nation or the neighboring Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation. 119 Twenty-first-century Pequots are not the only American Indians descended from genocide survivors. Northern California's Yuki Indians endured a similar ordeal. California's first civilian United States governor, Peter Burnett, set the stage in 1851 by declaring "[t]hat a war of extermination will continue to be waged . . . until the Indian race becomes extinct." 120 One month later, state legislators allocated $500,000 to fund Indian-hunting state militia campaigns. In 1852, the U.S. Senate then refused to ratify the eighteen treaties that would have set aside approximately 7 percent of California as federal Indian reservation lands, thus leaving California Indians without explicit federal protection. 121 The first known massacre of Yuki people followed less than two years later.
On May 15, 1854, white explorers entered Round Valley, the heart of the Yuki homeland, and preemptively massacred as many as forty Yuki people. Colonization followed, diminishing traditional food sources and pushing some Yuki to eat whites' livestock. In response, whites once again began massacring Yuki. One man later testified that in 1856, "the Indians were killing stock, and the whites were killing Indians." 122 Another explained: "for every beef that has been killed by them ten or fifteen Indians have been killed." 123 Yet another testified that in 1856, "the first expedition by the whites against the Indians was made, and have continued ever since . . . we would kill, on an average, fifty or sixty Indians on a trip . . . frequently we would have to turn out two or three times a week." 124 Such expeditions presumably killed hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of Yuki people.
Meanwhile, whites kidnapped Yuki women and children, taking advantage of laws that, between 1850 and 1863, allowed them to take and hold Indians-including children-for years at a time. By 1856, one Indian agent wrote of Yuki "squaws and children taken away by white men," and of Yuki men who "said they would all work at anything I wanted them to, if only I would protect their squaws and children." In 1857, another agent reported from Round Valley: "the Indians . . . have very few children-most of them doubtless having been stolen and sold." 125 That year the Yuki resisted by killing whites for the first time, and whites re- 125 According to California's 1850 Act for the Government and Protection of Indians, children could, with the consent of "friends" or "parents," be held and worked without pay until age fifteen for females or age eighteen for males. "[A]ny white person" could also visit a jail and pay "said fine and costs" for any "Indian . . . convicted of an offence . . . punishable by fine." Indian convicts then worked to pay off the fines their employer had paid on their behalf. Meanwhile, the act empowered whites to arrest Indian adults "found loitering and strolling about, or frequenting public places where liquors are sold, begging, or leading an immoral or profligate course of life." When a court received a "complaint" along these lines, the act required court officers to capture and then lease "such vagrant within twenty-four hours to the best bidder." Successful bidders could then legally hold and work convicts for up to four months without compensation. In 1860, legislators expanded the 1850 act. First, they legalized the "indenture" of "any Indian or Indians, whether children or grown persons," including "prisoners of war" and "any vagrant Indian" as "apprentices, to trades, husbandry, or other employments." Second, legislators gave judges the power to "bind" and apprentice Indian minors without the consent of their parents or guardians. Third, they allowed white employers to retain Indians indentured as minors beyond their attainment of majority age. Thus, boys under fourteen could be indentured until they turned twenty-five, and girls under fourteen until twenty-one. Fourth, teenagers indentured "over fourteen and under twenty years of age, if males," could be held "until they attain[ed] the age of thirty years; if females, until they attain[ed] the age of twenty-five years." Finally, Indians over age twenty could be indentured for a fixed term of ten years. Group 75.4 , General Records of the sponded with continued killing. In October 1857, Indian agent Thomas Henley warned that killing would "continue until the force of the whites is sufficient to overwhelm the Indians and exterminate them or drive them from the Reservation." Henley asked for federal troops to protect the Yuki, but as with others who echoed such requests, his appeal fell on deaf ears. 126 Whites killed twenty-seven Yuki during the first ten months of 1858, while 1860 depositions underscored some killers' genocidal intent. 127 According to one man, the livestock manager H. L. Hall "commenced killing all the Indians [he and his colleagues] could find in the mountains . . . I heard Mr. Hall say that he did not want any man to go with him to hunt Indians, who would not kill all he could find, because a knit would make a louse." 128 Army lieutenant Edward Dillon added that Hall "well nigh depopulated a country, which but a short time since swarmed with Indians." 129 Hall himself explained how, in one instance, "all the squaws were killed because they refused to go further. We took one boy into the valley, and the infants were put out of their misery, and a girl ten years of age was killed for stubbornness." 130 Finally, a Long Valley man testified that he and his comrades had "killed one hundred and fifty or two hundred Indians." 131 The destruction of Yuki people intensified that winter. Special Treasury Agent J. Ross Browne reported that in Round Valley, "during the winter of 1858-'59, more than a hundred and fifty peaceable Indians, including women and children, were cruelly slaughtered by the whites." Browne explained, "Armed parties went into the rancherias in open day, when no evil was apprehended, and shot the Indians downweak, harmless, and defenseless as they were-without distinction of age or sex; shot down women with sucking babes at their breasts; killed or crippled the naked children that were running about." 132 Despite the U.S. Army troops stationed in the valley, the killing continued because commanders had ordered regulars there not to confront or arrest whites. In April 1859, an informant told how "in the vicinity of Round Valley . . . within the past three weeks, from three to four hundred bucks, squaws and children have been killed." 133 Two weeks later, Major Edward Johnson reported: "the whites have waged a relentless war of extermination against the Yukas [and] have ruthlessly massacred people. However, between 1854 and 1864, the Yuki population had declined by 90 percent or more. 152 Although pushed to the brink of oblivion, Yuki people survived, and today some are members of California's Round Valley Indian Tribes.
THE PEQUOT AND YUKI CASES demonstrate the utility of documenting genocidal statements, massacres, body-part bounties, and mass death in government custody to identify, locate, and define cases of genocide in Native American history and beyond. In both genocides, policymakers and perpetrators expressed "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." Massacres, body-part bounties, and mass death in government custody provide additional evidence of genocidal intent, as well as evidence of genocidal acts including "Killing," "Causing serious bodily or mental harm," and "Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part." Containment in dangerous conditions and dispersal through kidnapping and slavery may constitute "Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group." Finally, kidnapping and slavery involved "Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." Studying the planning, execution, and aftermath of specific genocidal crimes can also reveal who ordered them, carried them out, and rewarded them, rather than lumping all architects, commanders, perpetrators, and accomplices together. This approach points the way toward an effective methodology with which to evaluate the question of genocide at any time and place in history.
The case study as a unit of analysis allows for the examination of whether or not a particular "national, ethnical, racial or religious group" suffered genocide. There may be questions about genocide that can be resolved only by analyzing crimes against multiple American Indian tribes, but for the purposes of resolving the American genocide debate, locating and documenting evidence for individual tribal histories avoids problems associated with considering all Native Americans together. Crucially, it moves away from misleading colonial constructs of race to focus on particular tribes. Case studies are also often more practical, specific, and useful to contemporary American Indian nations than lumping all Indians-across several centuries and millions of square miles-together. For example, studying tribes as nations-in discrete case studies-clarifies how regimes committed genocide even when other Native Americans did some of the killing. Case studies also provide an avenue for locating and delineating the specific genocidal crimes suffered by different tribes at different times at the hands of different perpetrators. Detailed case study analyses are an important new direction in genocide studies-a field often dominated by theoretical debates-offering a powerful tool with which to understand genocide and combat its denial around the world.
The case study method is not limited to locating and defining instances of genocide in the United States and its colonial antecedents. These methods can also be applied in other geographies where genocides may have occurred, such as Africa, Asia, Latin America, and beyond. They may be particularly useful in helping to move other national genocide debates forward. Indeed, detailed case studies examining genocide in Queensland, Tasmania, and Victoria have helped to advance the ongoing Australian genocide debate. 153 In those times and places where intended destruction, massacre, state-sponsored body-part bounties, and mass death in government custody appear, it makes sense to investigate the possibility of genocide. This involves refocusing the American genocide debate from a macro analysis to investigations of history at the tribal level. Each Native American population decline requires careful, detailed examination, not limited to the seventeenth-century Pequot or the nineteenth-century Yuki cases. Questions of genocidal intent, actions, and consequences must be meticulously investigated in each case. In the absence of robust case studies, general statements about whether or not "all" or "most" Native American tribes suffered genocide, even if germane, are difficult to substantiate. Moreover, the stakes are too high to limit our studies to such an all-or-nothing approach. The claim that not every American Indian tribe suffered genocide should not be allowed to block debate and further research into the question of genocide in U.S. history. Careful analyses of specific regions and tribes will provide the crucial building blocks upon which later metaanalyses can be built. By examining each case in detail, scholars will dignify its particularities and ultimately help create a clearer, more vivid mosaic of varied Native American experiences, and of U.S. history as a whole.
The "Old World" pathogens that non-Indians carried in their blood, mucus, saliva, and semen killed untold numbers of American Indians, but the ideas in their heads, coupled with the weapons in their hands, also led to mass violence, and in some cases genocide. It is not surprising that scholars have written so little about this topic. The violence that Native Americans suffered during America's conquest is painful to contemplate, and cannot be reversed. Yet rather than distancing ourselves from this traumatic history, we need to move closer to it.
Possible cases of genocide are worth investigating for many reasons, but three stand out. Decency demands that even long after the deaths of the victims, we preserve the truth of what befell them, so that their memory can be honored and the repetition of similar crimes deterred. Justice demands that even long after the perpetrators have vanished, we document the crimes that they and their advocates have too often concealed, denied, or suppressed. Finally, historical veracity demands that we carefully examine the Native American demographic catastrophe, in all its varied aspects and causes, in order to better understand formative events in both Native American and United States history.
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